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Abstract 
Electronic voting, as one of the main 
applications of Electronic Democracy, has 
come to the attention of many governments in 
their movement to modernize elections. 
Although very popular with many visionaries 
and politicians, there is a lot of controversy for 
the use of electronic means in elections. 
Especially in young democracies, so-called 
democracies in transition have to invite 
international election observers to raise the 
level of transparency and to calm discussions. 
There exists a lot of documentation and 
guidelines on the topic of election observation 
of paper-based voting. As the observation of 
electronic voting processes is very new, there 
exists little to no experience with it. In this 
paper, the authors present a model for how to 
detect threats to the voter’s anonymity using 
common criteria methodology. The work is 
based on experiences in the 2005 
parliamentary elections in Venezuela, as e-
voting experts to audit the parliamentarian 
elections where e-voting machines with a 
voter verifiable audit trail were used. To do 
so, a background on electronic voting in 
Venezuela is first given; then the Common 
Criteria methodology is described and applied 
it to the e-voting process. Finally, a 
summarized model of how to observe 
elections with electronic voting machines is 
discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past few years, many governments 
have started to adopt computer-supported 
applications for their administrative 
processes; applications range from the 
simple download of forms to Internet-based 
submission of applications. Amongst these 
the most controversial application is 
electronic voting, which stands for the use of 
electronic means in elections.  
Around the world, many experiments and 
reports on the use of electronic voting have 
been conducted. The several approaches 
can be categorized in: (1) countries 
conducting voting in small binding field trials 
(France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom); 
(2) countries conducting non-binding remote 
electronic voting tests (Austria, Denmark, 
Spain); (3) countries that have implemented 
voting machines (India, Ireland, Germany, 
the United States, Germany, Brazil, 
Venezuela); and (4) only Estonia 
implemented remote electronic voting in 
their 2005 local elections as a legally binding 
voting channel available to any voter to date 
[for an overview see 1].  
Although worldwide approaches might be 
different in detail, all efforts still share 
criticism by the public concerning the lack of 
transparency of the machines or 
applications. Recent studies by Oostveen 
and van den Besselaar have shown that 
trust in the e-voting process is not 
dependent on the actual level of security but 
on the user’s belief of how secure the 
system is [2]. This belief is largely 
dependent on the transparency of a system 
and here the “main challenge for electronic 
voting [lies in] the lack of transparency” [3]. 
Traditionally, countries that are considered 
to be young, or so-called transition 
democracies, are expected to invite 
international election observers to guarantee 
elections in accordance with international 
standards. There is a great deal of 
documentation and guidelines on this topic 
for how to observe traditional paper-based 
voting. As the observation of electronic 
voting processes is very new, there exists 
little experience with it.  
The authors therefore develop a model for 
how to detect threats to the voter’s 
anonymity based on experiences in the 
2005 parliamentary elections in Venezuela, 
which used e-voting machines with a voter 
verifiable audit trail.  
To do so, we first give a background on 
electronic voting in Venezuela, then 
describe the common criteria methodology 
and apply it to the e-voting process. Finally, 
we present the summarized model of how to 
observe elections with electronic voting 
machines. 
2. Electronic Voting in 
Venezuela 
The reasons for the high tensions when 
talking about e-voting projects are manifold. 
Amongst the most important reasons are in 
accordance to [4]: enabling mobility of the 
voters, facilitating the participation in 
elections from abroad, reducing costs, 
raising voter turnout by offering additional 
channels, widening access for citizens with 
disabilities, and delivering voting results 
reliably and more quickly.. 
In transition democracies the last two 
reasons are especially important as they 
promise to solve, on the one hand, problems 
with illiteracy of the population and, on the 
other hand, problems with infrastructure in 
regards to delivering the results in time. 
Technology alone cannot solve problems in 
education and infrastructure. 
It is especially important to know which 
voting processes are intended to be 
supported by e-voting. The first voting 
machines date back to the end of the 19th 
century, and only served as an aid in 
counting the votes. By now, machines can 
support all three main voting processes: (1) 
the Pre-Election Phase: identification of the 
voter and checking eligibility; (2) the Election 
Phase: casting the vote; and (3) the Post-
Election Phase: counting the votes. 
The main challenge for any voting is to solve 
the problem of unequivocally identifying the 
voter’s eligibility while at the same time 
guaranteeing their anonymity and still 
delivering an accurate and verifiable result.  
This is especially challenging using an 
electronic medium. Both paper and 
electronic media share common problems in 
either controlled or uncontrolled 
environments. In the latter there is the 
shared problem of vote buying and vote 
coercion [5]. Due to these shared problems 
it is advisable to begin with a structured 
overview on the different forms of voting.
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Electronic Voting  
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 Networked Kiosk Electronic Voting Machine  
 
 
Table 1: Forms of voting [6] 
 
In the 2005 Venezuela parliamentary 
elections, networked electronic voting 
machines were used that consisted of two 
parts: 
1. The Captahuella, which is a notebook 
with an attached fingerprint reader. The 
notebook has a database with a list of 
eligible voters and, if available, their 
fingerprints. The computers were used to 
identify the voter using their ID-card and 
to check the authenticity by comparing 
the fingerprint to the stored image. In 
case it was not available, it was captured 
for future comparisons. After the election 
was finished the machines were 
connected to the central server to upload 
the data on who voted and who did not. 
These machines were used only in part 
and for testing purposes.  
2. The electronic voting machines, which 
were manufactured by Smartmatic, cast 
the votes of the voters. Each of the 
27,000 polling stations were equipped 
with one such machine. After the end of 
the election each machine was 
connected to the central counting server 
using cell phones, landlines, or satellite 
connections to submit the votes to the 
server. 
 
Figure 1: The Venezuelan networked 
E-Voting Machine 
Although the machines were strictly 
separated, during the audits a flaw was 
found in the voting machines that would 
have allowed for reconstruction of the 
sequence the voters cast their votes. This 
led to the removal of the Captahuellas, as 
without them there was no automated way 
to register the sequence [7]. 
The problem with the feared secrecy of the 
vote was not the only problem in Venezuela, 
but one major outcome of the observation 
mission. In order to come to such results in 
a structured way this paper proposes a 
model on e-voting observation. We use 
common criteria methodology to develop 
possible threats to the voter’s anonymity and 
then to deduct the tasks for the observers to 
detect them. Although in this paper the 
authors concentrate on networked electronic 
voting machines with connected 
identification and vote casting, as intended 
to be used in Venezuela, appropriate 
references for the situation for remote 
electronic voting are given. 
3. Developing the 
Methodology on 
how to Observe  
E-Voting 
For analyzing electronic voting threats, we 
use the methodology of the internationally 
accepted framework of the Common Criteria 
(CC) [8]. They are an international standard 
(ISO 15408) for computer security. The 
official name is “The Common Criteria for 
Information Technology Security 
Evaluation”. Its purpose is to allow 
developers to specify the security attributes 
of their products, and to allow evaluators to 
determine if products actually meet their 
claims. The Common Criteria are improved 
continually. Now, the official Common 
Criteria is on version V2.3. Today many 
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nations (e.g., Germany, France, and the UK) 
have introduced the Common Criteria to 
define and certify IT security products and 
procedures. There is a growing list of 
nations that at least accept the CC-
certificates (e.g., Austria, Spain, Greece, 
and Italy). 
For our purpose, we work following the CC-
structure similarly to a vulnerability and 
security analysis to:  
 
1. define the security objective (i.e., what is 
to be protected),  
2. analyse the possible threats (attacks) to 
these objectives,  
3. approach these threats using functional 
or operation security functions,  
4. and finally check what the observer can 
do to ensure that threats are handled 
properly. 
 
The clear differentiation between the threats 
that have to be dealt with and the 
environment in which the system is run is a 
clear benefit from the common criteria 
formalization. This also helps formulate 
instructions to the observers.  
3.1. Security Objectives 
Electronic Voting and elections respectively 
have to meet the international election 
standards. Consequently, the security 
objectives for voting systems - either 
electronic or paper-based – have to be 
deduced from these standards. Here the 
main ones are the election principles that 
demand an election to ensure a free, secret, 
universal, and equal election. In this paper, 
we want to concentrate on election secrecy 
and election freedom, respectively. Only a 
voter who can cast an anonymous (secret) 
vote can cast their ballot without any 
coercion. The secrecy objective as such is a 
very general objective that can be split up in 
more precise objectives:  
1. The E-Voting system must ensure that 
the link between the content of a vote 
and the voter be irreversible. 
More precisely, the secrecy of the vote 
has to be guaranteed during the casting, 
transfer, reception, collection, and 
tabulation of votes. Very important in this 
point is that the secrecy must also be 
ensured at any time in the future [9], at 
least when talking about parliamentary 
elections. 
None of the actors involved in the voting 
process (organizers, election officials, 
trusted third parties, voters, and 
attackers from inside and/or outside) is 
able to link the content of a vote to an 
identifiable voter. 
2. No voter should be able to prove that 
he/she voted in a particular way, in order 
to prevent voter coercion and ballot 
buying. 
For the following discussion, we will 
concentrate on the secrecy objectives, 
which are implicitly deduced from the 
important operational policy of the 
international election standards.  
The central question an observer has during 
the whole voting process is whether or not 
an attacker has the possibility to link the 
voter to their vote and if so, how. 
3.2. General Threats 
The following description of threats includes 
all threats to the election secrecy against 
which specific protection within an E-Voting 
system or within its environment is required. 
The attacker needs points in the voting 
process at which he gets information about 
the voter and his ballot as well. Thus, there 
are several points at which the attacker can 
try to interact with the E-Voting System: 
- The Act of Ballot Casting: the attacker 
could physically observe the voter 
casting their ballot at the voting terminal.   
- The Electronic Ballot Casting Device: a 
‘Trojan horse’ on the voting terminal.  
- The Voting Protocol: sniffing on the 
network.  
- The Electoral Server: depending on the 
applied voting protocol, the election 
servers are another attacking point.  
- Other Anonymity Threats: the Voter 
Audit Trail could also be used to link a 
voter to their vote. 
In general, there are four different 
possibilities to link the electronic voter ID to 
her electronic ballot. The simplest one would 
be messages consisting of both the voter ID 
and the ballot. Other possibilities are the 
protocol sequence and the time when the 
voter was identified and cast their vote, the 
IP addresses used to first send the voter ID 
and later the voter’s ballot. 
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Sequence, Time
Who?
Voter
(Identification)
What?
Vote
(Ballot Casting)
IP-Addresses, Message Content
How?
 
Figure 2: Ways the voter can be linked to their vote 
 
3.3. Security Requirements 
Thus, an E-Voting system has to meet 
several security requirements to overcome 
all these threats. There exist several 
catalogues of security requirements that 
have been deduced from all election 
principles. A good summery of relevant and 
common requirements can be found in [4]. 
In the following we will only take those into 
account that belong to the defined secrecy 
objectives. Here the generic requirement is 
defined as follows: “E-Voting shall be 
organised in such a way as to exclude at 
any stage of the voting procedure and, in 
particular, at voter authentication, anything 
that would endanger the secrecy of the 
vote.” [4, No. 16 in IV Secret suffrage] We 
will have a more detailed look as it is also 
done in the catalogues and divide the 
requirements in functional (F) and the 
environment (E). The observer has to verify 
both; the first one with respect to the E-
Voting system itself and the second group of 
requirements with respect to the 
environment in which the system is applied.  
3.4. Observer’s Tasks 
The fourth and final step in our analysis is 
the definition of the observer’s tasks to be 
done during their observation mission. 
These concrete measures provide a basic 
checklist for the observer to check if their 
observations are complete or if there is a 
situation or check that has not been thought 
of; thus completes our model to e-voting 
observation. 
4. Analysis of the 
Threats to Voter’s 
Anonymity 
In the following we will discuss the threats 
and the attacks in more detail. Each threat is 
described in terms of an identified threat 
agent and the attack. Aspects such as 
expertise and available resources are 
addressed, as well as attack methods and 
any vulnerability exploited. We deduce the 
functional and environmental requirements 
to list what the observer shall verify with 
respect to either the technical system or the 
operational and organisational environment, 
and come up with recommendations for 
what to observe. Therefore, we will discuss 
each of the five general threats separately. 
4.1. The Act of Ballot Casting 
and Anonymity 
Threats. The most obvious threat to the 
voter’s anonymity is given in the polling 
station. The attacker could observe the voter 
casting their ballot at the voting terminal. 
There are two possibilities to do so. First, 
the attacker can be physically present at the 
polling station and look over the voter’s 
shoulder. This would be quite obvious. 
However, an attacker could observe the 
voter casting their ballot from distance, e.g., 
through the window (T1). Second, the 
attacker could have installed a camera that 
films the voter casting their vote in the 
polling booth. In particular, the monitor of the 
voting terminal is filmed (T2). Even if both 
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threats are not specific for Online-Voting - 
both are also applicable within traditional 
ballot casting - an observer has to take 
these into account.  
Security Requirements. From threat (T1) 
and (T2), which are very similar from their 
ideas, we can deduce one requirement to 
the environment (E1): the terminal has to be 
applied in a secure environment with respect 
to personal and technical (e.g., camera) 
observation. Voters must not be able to 
observe each other and the electoral staff 
must not be able to observe the voter 
applying the election terminal (E2). There 
are special requirements for the position: 
e.g., the polling booth must not be situated 
next to a window in order to prevent 
observations from outside, or next to steps 
where everyone who goes up or down can 
see how the voter votes. 
Observer Tasks. The election observer has 
to control whether or not there is a polling 
booth (C1). In addition, they must check 
whether or not the polling booth is shaped in 
a way that the voter can cast their ballot 
unobserved (C2). Moreover, the observer 
has to look for camera objectives (C3). 
Remote. In the case of a remote E-Voting 
System, the election observer cannot avoid 
voters being observed when casting their 
ballot. In this case, the problem is 
comparable to the one with postal voting 
and should be treated in the same way [2] 
(e.g., as in Germany where postal voting is 
only allowed as an exception because the 
voter is ill or away on the Election Day). 
4.2. The Electronic Ballot 
Casting Device and 
Anonymity 
Threats. In general, the voting 
terminal/device in an E-Voting System for 
polling stations is some kind of computer 
(hardware and software components as well 
as an operating system). This computer 
must be connected to the Internet to check 
the voter’s right to vote and to transmit the 
ballot. The main problem is that terminals 
know the voter’s ID and the voter’s decision 
in plaintext. Thus, the attacker could try to 
manipulate the terminal in order to either 
forward to himself the voter’s ballot 
unencrypted together with the voter’s ID or 
to store the information at the terminal. In 
the latter case, the attacker needs access to 
the terminal to get the stored data, e.g., after 
the election or during the election with the 
help of a memory device (simply burned on 
a CD at the terminal). The data (ballot and 
voter ID) can also be transmitted by other 
interfaces: e.g., Bluetooth or Infrared. Both 
forms of manipulation can be done by wrong 
voting software (T3) or by Trojan horses or 
other viruses (T4) on the voting device/ 
computer. The Trojan horse could sniff the 
data from the input devices (keyboard 
and/or mouse) to get the voter’s ID and 
voting decision in order to transmit it to the 
attacker. Thus, available sniffing Trojan 
horses have “only” to be modified a little bit. 
In the first case, the attacker installs the 
wrong voting software – software whose 
user interface is similar to the correct one 
but with the additional function to transmit 
the ballot unencrypted, together with the 
voter’s ID, to the attacker. The attacker has 
three possibilities to get the wrong software 
installed: first he could try to fake the 
delivered terminals by installing the wrong 
software. Second, in case he is an eligible 
voter he could try to change the software 
when he is (unobserved) in the polling 
booth. Last, he could try to substitute the 
correct software with the fake software by 
remote access via the Internet. Trojan horse 
or other malware could also either be 
installed at the delivered voting terminal, by 
an attacker who is an eligible voter and has 
access to the polling booth, or by 
unauthorized remote access. Thereby it is 
easier to get a Trojan horse installed on the 
terminal which just listens but not influence 
the process, than it is to substitute the whole 
or part of the voting software. 
Security Requirements. The terminal’s 
deployment and delivery to the polling booth 
must be organized in a way that 
manipulation is excluded (E3). There must 
be a possibility to check if the terminal is 
authorized (E4). In addition, the system 
must provide a function to verify if the right 
voting software is installed (F1). 
Observer Tasks. Before the election itself 
the observer has to ask for the delivery 
procedure and verify it (C4). An observer 
has to check whether or not the terminal is 
correct and not modified. This has to be 
done before the election but also during the 
Election Day (C5). An analogous check for 
the correctness of the installed software has 
to be done before the election and several 
times during the Election Day (C6). First, the 
observer has to verify if the voting software 
ensures that the ballots and/or voter ID 
information is only sent encrypted and only 
addressed to the election servers. In 
addition, the respective information must be 
encrypted in a way that only the 
corresponding electoral server is able to 
decrypt the message. Moreover, it must be 
checked that the software does not store the 
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voter’s ID and ballot on the terminal. In 
addition, the information deleted from these 
needs to be irreversible. This is so that an 
attacker who has access to the terminals 
after the election does not get any 
information by analyzing its databases, 
memory, and so on. Next, the election 
observer must have the possibility to verify if 
the software on the terminal is the one they 
checked and verified before. This could be 
done by a checksum generator. The 
observer must either check this value 
several times on the Election Day – in best 
case before each voter casts their ballot - or 
have the system offer a mechanism that 
automatically verifies if the correct software 
is installed. This software should also check 
if the whole terminal configuration is still 
satisfactory. In addition, the observer has to 
verify whether or not the terminal prevents 
unauthorized Internet access (C7) so that 
changing the software and the installation of 
malware can be excluded. To do so, they 
have to check: 
- Are the applied Firewall and Virus 
Scanners state of the art? Are they 
correctly configured? 
- Are only the needed communication 
ports open and all others blocked?  
- Is the only software installed that which 
is needed? 
- What kind of operating system is 
installed? The best case would be an 
operating system that separates the 
software in a way that different software 
does not influence each other. 
Moreover, the election observer has to 
check whether or not an attacker has the 
possibility to modify the terminal by access 
in the polling booth (C8). So the terminal 
must only offer the voter/the attacker the 
possibility to authenticate and to cast a 
ballot. But it must not be made up of a whole 
keyboard and the voter cannot have the 
possibility to reboot the system. In addition, 
the voter/attacker must not have access to 
the hardware or any external interfaces like 
a drive. Additionally, the election observer 
must verify that the terminal does not have 
any external transmission interfaces like 
Bluetooth and infrared. All the named 
checks could be simplified and reduced by 
the application of Trusted Computing. The 
observer also has to check if all locally 
stored data is deleted after the election, 
using safe data disposal methods (C9). 
Remote. Within remote E-Voting this is even 
more of a problem, because, in general, we 
cannot make any statements about the 
trustworthiness of arbitrary voter PCs; also, 
the voter’s will not, in general, be able to 
verify or improve the trustworthiness self-
dependently. In addition, the application of 
Trusted Computing is impossible because of 
the cost and usability point of views, at least 
at present. 
4.3. The Voting Protocol and 
Anonymity 
Threats. Another point to violate the voter’s 
anonymity is sniffing on the Internet. The 
problem here is that the voter's ID, as well 
as their (encrypted) ballot, is sent over the 
Internet. The attack scenario is the following: 
the observer sniffs all voting protocol 
messages transmitted to the electoral 
server, stores this data in a database, and 
analyses it after the election (T5). He can 
sort the messages by their timestamp. Thus, 
though this they could know the whole 
protocol for each voter. But, the attacker 
does not know which message block can be 
assigned to which voter, because these 
messages are encrypted - encrypted with 
state-of-the-art encryption algorithms. The 
problem with respect to the anonymity 
requirement is that the chosen algorithms 
are classified to be secure for the present, 
but no statements for the future can be 
made. On the one hand, single protocol 
messages can always be decrypted by 
using adequate computational power; e.g., 
by Brute Force trials. On the other hand, all 
messages can be encrypted at an arbitrary 
time when someone finds a fast algorithm to 
decrypt messages without the knowledge of 
the secret key. Thus, depending on the 
attacker’s computational power, they will be 
in a position to decrypt all or at least single 
encrypted ballot messages after the 
election. When this future date will be 
depends on the strength of the encryption 
function. At some point in the future the 
networking observer is able to link a 
decrypted ballot to a voter. Thus, temporal 
unlimited election secrecy is not ensured 
against such a network attacker. The 
chosen attack potential is quite high, but the 
attack is in general not impossible. At least 
within political elections we keep this in 
mind. 
Security Requirements. The com-
munication between the E-Voting clients and 
the servers should be done in a network that 
limits possibilities of external sniffing (E5). 
Observer Tasks. So, the question to be 
answered by the election observer for the 
individual voting protocols is whether the 
sniffing attacker is able to link the decrypted 
vote to an identified voter or if he only gets 
decrypted ballot messages but cannot link 
these to single voters. Therefore, the time-
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stamp must become useless. The election 
observer has to verify if the applied protocol 
and system setup prevents the violation of 
the voter’s anonymity in an adequate way 
(C10). This could be done by a special 
secure network or the application of mixed 
networks. So, all protocol messages pass a 
mix or a mix cascade, which forwards 
several messages at the same time to the 
electoral server. Here the sniffing nodes are 
limited and the observer has to sniff on 
nodes before the first mix because the 
messages are made anonymous by mixing 
the messages. So it gets more difficult for 
the sniffing attacker because he cannot sniff 
at an arbitrary node. Time constraints are a 
problem with this approach. The mix will 
only start working when they receive several 
protocol messages. Thus, the voter in the 
polling booth can only continue when some 
other voters vote at the same point of time. 
Another possibility is to meet the anonymity 
problem on the protocol layer at the local 
storage of the ballots. The stored ballots are 
either transmitted at the end of the Election 
Day or they are transmitted in blocks of 
ballots as introduced in [10]. Within the latter 
solutions the election observer has to 
ensure that the software randomly mixes the 
ballots before storing them locally or sending 
them to the electoral server (C11) [4, 11]. 
Remote. The protocol analysis in [12] shows 
that the voting protocols for remote E-Voting 
do not ensure temporal unlimited election 
secrecy because of the bindings to the 
voter's IP-address. Here the observer has to 
check if an adequate solution is offered: 
e.g., multi-ballot casting with the option to 
cast the vote in the polling booth even if the 
voter has already cast an electronic vote 
(this improvement produces legal problems 
with respect to the equal election), the 
application of mix-networks to complicate 
sniffing, and separation between the voter 
verification phase and the ballot casting 
phase. Here the general idea is that the 
voter's IP-address is different for both 
phases. If the observer collects messages 
with the same IP-addresses, he does not 
know if both messages are from the same 
voter or not. 
4.4. The Electoral Server and 
Anonymity 
Threats. The election servers are yet 
another attacking point. The attacker could 
either attack both the election register as 
well as the ballot box. From the first server 
he might get the allocation [voter ID, 
terminal-number, time] and from the ballot 
box the allocation [terminal, time, ballot] or 
at least [terminal, time, encrypted-ballot]. 
With this knowledge the attacker can either 
directly allocate a voter ID to a ballot or be 
able to do so when they are able to decrypt 
the corresponding ballot (T6). Another 
possibility is that the attacker only gets 
access to the ballot box, but in addition they 
can observe who cast their vote at what time 
in a particular polling booth (this is possible 
because the polling station is a public place) 
(T7). Here the attacker allocates his 
observing knowledge [voter, terminal-
number, time] with the allocation from the 
ballot box. In both cases the attacker is able 
to break the anonymity. Just like with the 
terminal security, the attacker could try to 
get physical access to the server or through 
the Internet. The attacker can try to transmit 
the information or get it through physical 
access (T8).  
Security Requirements. The administration 
of both the E-Voting machines and the 
servers has to make sure no person is able 
to access the data (E6). In addition, the 
system must provide for a safe data disposal 
procedure at a reasonable time after the 
election (F2) 
Observer Tasks. Researchers and system 
developers come up against this threat with 
organizational measures, e.g., access 
control based on the four-eyes-principle [13]. 
The election observer has to check if such 
concepts are implemented (C12). 
Additionally, he has to verify that the ballot 
box deletes information about time and the 
terminal in an irrevocable way (C13). So, 
only the ballot (or the encrypted data) is 
stored. To prevent access to the servers the 
server has to provide the same security 
measures as the terminal (C14). This has to 
be checked by the election observer. 
Furthermore, the observer has to check that 
all data on the respective systems are safely 
disposed ay a reasonable time after the 
election because the data stored in separate 
locations (registration and ballot box 
servers, clients) could be used to link the 
voter to the vote (C15). 
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4.5. Other Anonymity 
Threats: Voter Audit 
Trails 
Threats. Some voting systems offer a voter 
audit trail [14] to increase the voter’s 
confidence to the new election system. 
Hereby the voters get some information 
either on paper or through digital 
information. The voters check if the 
information on the paper is the same as on 
the E-Voting Machine and later put in a 
separate ballot box so a recount is possible. 
The problem is that the audit trail could be 
used by the voter to prove against their 
decision (T9). So the system could give the 
voter a possibility to break their own 
anonymity. Moreover, such an audit trail 
could be used for ballot buying. The voter 
could prove to the purchaser how they voted 
and then get money for it.  
Security Requirements. The voting 
process in the polling station should be 
organized in a way that no voter can leave 
the station without putting the voter audit 
trail paper in a separate ballot box (E7). The 
system must provide a way that the voter 
audit paper proves the decision (F3). 
Observer Tasks. In any voting system that 
provides a voter audit trail, the election 
observer has to check if the received recipe 
can be used to prove the decision (C16). 
This could be done either by cryptographic 
functions or by paper audit trail, which the 
voter has to put in the turn box before 
leaving the polling station. In the first case, 
the voter’s decision can only be verified with 
the help of an electoral device, but otherwise 
not because the information is decrypted or 
it is stored on a device that can only be read 
by the electoral device. In the later case the 
paper ballots can be counted if there are 
problems with the E-Voting system or if 
someone mistrusts the electronic result. 
Further, the observers have to check the 
layout of the polling stations so no voter is 
able to take the audit paper with them (C17). 
Remote. Here it is only possible to apply 
cryptographic alternatives in order to provide 
audit trails. A paper audit trail is not possible 
because of ballot buying and voter coercion 
with respect to the paper the voter would get 
at home. Here the chosen algorithm has to 
be verified with respect to anonymity 
leakage.  
 
4.6. Overview of Threats, 
Security Requirements, 
and Observer Tasks 
In the previous subchapters we analysed the 
possible places (act of ballot casting, 
electronic ballot casting device, the voting 
protocol, the electoral servers, and other 
anonymity threats like VVAT) where an 
attacker could try to deface the voter’s 
secrecy. Now we try to contrast the threats 
and environmental and functional 
requirements to the observer’s tasks in the 
table on the next page. 
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Place Threats Security Requirements Observer tasks 
Ballot 
Casting 
T1: Observation 
from distance 
T2: Filming the 
casting 
E1: Place E-Voting 
Machine in secure 
environment 
E2: Polling staff must not 
observe 
C1: Is there a polling 
booth? 
C2: Is the booth 
unobservable? 
C3: Are there 
cameras? 
Casting 
Device 
T3: Wrong software 
T4: Trojan 
horses/viruses 
E3: Secure deployment 
E4: Right terminal 
F1: Right software 
C4: Check delivery 
procedure? 
C5: Right terminal? 
C6: Right software? 
C7: Unauthorized 
internet access? 
C8: Unauthorized 
access in polling 
station? 
C9: Safe disposal of 
local data? 
Voting 
Protocol 
T5: Sniffing and 
collecting data 
E5: Secure 
communication 
C10: Violation of 
anonymity 
protocol and 
system setup? 
C11: Random mixing 
of ballots? 
Electoral 
Servers 
T6: Breaking 
encryption 
T7: Allocating 
observation with 
data 
T8: Physical access 
E6: No access to 
machines and 
servers possible 
F2: Safe data disposal 
C12: Check for four-
eye principle? 
C13: Deletion 
irrevocable? 
C14: Unauthorized 
access to server? 
C15: Safe data 
disposal? 
Other 
Measures 
T9: Use VVAT to 
prove decision 
to third parties 
E7: Voter taking VVAT 
out of PS 
F3: VVAT must prove 
decision to voting 
machine 
C16: Check if VVAT is 
proving a ballot 
right of the voting 
machine? 
C17: No voter taking 
VVAT along? 
Table 2: Overview of observer tasks to check for anonymity 
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5. Conclusion 
The method we presented here is based on 
the experience made in the Venezuelan 
election. The method presents a way to 
verify whether or not threats to voter’s 
anonymity in an election using Electronic 
Voting Machines have been addressed 
adequately. Still, the described checks are 
difficult to perform as not all data might be 
available or not everything can be observed 
due to local traditions (as was the case in 
the above election).  
It would help if the Electronic Voting 
Machines were certified and developed 
using common criteria. In this case the 
observers would only have to check the CC 
inspection report and security target of the 
machines to ensure that all necessary 
measures have been taken. Then the 
observer could concentrate on the polling 
stations and would not have to stick to 
software evaluations. 
One point that is open for discussion is 
whether the observers should only check 
concepts or if they should also check the 
source code for the right implementation of 
the concepts. Further, the observer also has 
to define the attacker potential because this 
allows for elimination of some threats, as the 
attacker is not able to conduct the described 
attacks. 
We are sure that this model of observing e-
voting helps raise the transparency in 
elections using electronic devices and leads, 
in the end, hopefully to higher confidence of 
the voters in the democratic system. 
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